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Abstract 
With the liberalization of the Swedish banking system in the 1980s, there was a rapid credit 
expansion, and real estate prices soared. When the Swedish economy began to weaken, real 
estate prices began to decline, and finance companies faced difficulties. Swedish banks were 
not insulated from financial pressures, and Nordbanken, a majority state-owned bank, 
declared large credit losses in 1990. The Swedish government’s response was initially ad hoc 
and targeted to specific banks, but in 1992, the government announced an open-ended 
guarantee of all bank liabilities. The crisis response also included a bank restructuring 
program and the establishment of targeted asset management companies (AMCs) to manage 
bad assets from two banks. In 1993, the government took over Securum, which had been 
established as an internal bad bank subsidiary of Nordbanken. Another government-owned 
entity, Retriva, took over bad assets from Gota Bank in 1994, and Securum and Retriva 
merged in 1996. In total, Securum and Retriva acquired SEK 112 billion (USD 871 million) in 
assets at a reduced book value of SEK 66 billion, reflecting substantial write-downs. The 
government funded Securum and Retriva with equity capital totaling SEK 28 billion and 
guaranteed loans totaling SEK 14 billion. Securum immediately focused on preserving asset 
value, with most debtor companies undergoing bankruptcy while Securum took over the 
underlying collateral. Real estate assets comprised the majority of Securum’s portfolio. To 
manage and dispose of assets, Securum and Retriva established specialized subsidiary units 
for real estate, industrial companies, and foreign holdings. When it closed in 1997, Securum 
had disposed of 98% of its portfolio of assets and utilized private sales and initial public 
offerings to dispose of property portfolios. Securum wound down earlier than anticipated, 
after five years of operations, and is considered to be an example of the successful use of an 
AMC to manage bad debt a successful example of an AMC. 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at  
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 
 





At a Glance 
In the 1980s, deregulation of the 
Swedish financial markets led to a 
significant credit expansion (Securum 
AB 1997). The pre-liberalization period 
included government-imposed 
regulations on banks such as credit 
lending ceilings, interest rate limits, 
and requirements to invest a specified 
portion of capital in government and 
housing bonds. As a part of the 
deregulatory and liberalizations efforts, 
the government lifted the average 
interest rate cap for lending and 
eliminated lending ceilings. The 
deregulation enabled banks to lend 
more broadly to meet credit demand 
(Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). Banks 
and finance companies pursued riskier 
lending practices as they sought to 
increase their market share, leading to 
a credit boom (Securum AB 1997). 
Total lending in Sweden increased by 
more than 100% from 1986 to 1989 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
The increased lending flowed to asset 
markets—including the commercial 
real estate (CRE), housing, and stock 
markets—which led to an increase in 
asset prices. The bubble burst in the 
early 1990s, and a number of factors led 
to a sharp increase in real interest rates. The Swedish krona was pegged to a basket of 
European currencies, and rate increases in Germany following reunification were 
transmitted to Sweden and Europe more broadly. Furthermore, the Swedish Riksbank raised 
interest rates in response to speculative attacks against the krona (Jonung, Kiander, and 
Vartia 2009). In addition to increasing interest rates, the 1990–1991 tax reform reduced the 
tax deductibility of mortgage borrowing. Borrowing fell alongside falling real estate prices 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To streamline Nordbanken [and Gota Bank] and 
create conditions for recovery, in a commercial manner, of 
as much as possible of the bad credits, while also helping 
to stabilize the financial markets and the real estate 
market” (Securum AB 1997) 
Launch Dates Announced: Securum in 1992 and 
Retriva in 1993 
Operational: Securum in 1992 and 
Retriva in 1993  
Wind-Down Dates Retriva merged with Securum in 
1996, and Securum wound down in 
1997 
Size and Type of 
NPL Problem 
NPLs amounted to 15% of GDP 
Real estate and corporate loans 
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible 
Institutions 
Only Nordbanken was eligible for 
Securum and Gota Bank for Retriva. 
The government took over the two 
banks, and they participated on a 
mandatory basis 
Open and closed 
Usage Loans, shares, and real estate of SEK 
112 billion at face value transferred 
to Securum/Retriva for a purchase 
price of SEK 66 billion 
Outcomes Securum/Retriva disposed of 98% of 
assets by 1997 and returned capital 





Notable Features Considered to be highly successful; 
set up specialized subsidiary units; 
disposed of properties through IPOs 
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(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Fire sales exacerbated asset price declines, and unemployment 
rose from 2% in 1990 to 10% in 1993 (Jonung, Kiander, and Vartia 2009). The inadequate 
fiscal response exacerbated the overheating of the economy, leading to inflationary 
pressures. The Riksbank intervened to maintain the pegged exchange rate until November 
19, 1992, after which the Riksbank allowed the krona to float (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
As early as 1990, finance companies had begun to show signs of weakness, as one finance 
company suspended payments in 1990, and the suspension led to heightened attention on 
finance companies with large exposures to real estate (Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). This 
triggered the collapse of the commercial paper market in Sweden. Finance companies were 
a type of financial institution subject to less stringent regulations and considered to be part 
of the shadow banking sector (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). It was initially expected that the 
issues would remain isolated with finance companies rather than permeate the entire 
banking system because banks were subject to more stringent collateral requirements. 
However, banks had lent to finance companies and had invested in their securities (Drees 
and Pazarbasioglu 1995). 
In August 1990, Nordbanken—one of the largest Swedish banks that was majority state-
owned—reported losses of SEK 1.7 billion, leading the Swedish Bank Inspection Board to 
audit the bank. The inspection determined that poor credit management had led to the 
significant losses; as a result, the board and CEO of Nordbanken resigned in 1990. The new 
management implemented a credit freeze to evaluate the severity of issues at Nordbanken 
and discovered that the bank had significant exposures to individual groups or companies; 
one such company, the Penser Group, represented 90% of Nordbanken’s equity capital. In 
response, the bank formed the so-called “Intensive Care” unit, which took on the worst of 
Nordbanken’s loan portfolio, thus beginning the separation of good and bad assets (Securum 
AB 1997). 
Another finance company, Gamlestaden, reported negative equity of SEK 1.6 billion. Nobel 
Industrier, the main company of the Penser Group to which Nordbanken had a large 
exposure, had pledged to inject new capital if the solvency of Gamlestaden ever fell below 
16%. This would have led to bankruptcy for Nobel Industrier, thus wiping out a significant 
amount of Nordbanken’s collateral in Penser. Because of this, Nordbanken injected SEK 2.3 
billion in Gamlestaden and injected additional capital in Nobel Industrier (Securum AB 
1997). 
Problems within Nordbanken persisted, and in order to address the growing financial crisis, 
the Swedish government initially adopted an ad hoc approach targeting Nordbanken and 
Första Sparbanken, another struggling bank. A capital injection in 1991 for Nordbanken and 
a guaranteed loan to Första Sparbanken provided temporary relief, but conditions at both 
banks continued to deteriorate. A third bank—Gota Bank—showed signs of weakness 
beginning in May 1992, and the combination of bank problems and the currency crisis led 
the government to conclude that the crisis was reaching a systemic level in August 1992 
(Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). 
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Conditions at Nordbanken continued to deteriorate in 1992, and it was expected that the 
bank would not maintain a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8% without an additional capital 
injection and the divestment of the Intensive Care unit, which had since been renamed 
“Securum.” In the spring of 1992, the government recapitalized Nordbanken with SEK 10 
billion, and Securum received a capital injection of SEK 24 billion. By this time, the 
government had become the full owner of Nordbanken, and in the beginning of 1993, the 
government assumed full ownership of Securum, thus separating the bad bank from the good 
bank (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum acquired 3,000 loans with a face value of SEK 67 billion (USD 521 million).3 As part 
of the pricing and transfer, Nordbanken wrote down the assets by SEK 17 billion, making the 
“purchase price” of the portfolio SEK 50 billion. The government provided SEK 24 billion in 
funding in the form of equity while Nordbanken provided SEK 27 billion in loans at favorable 
terms, of which the government guaranteed SEK 10 billion. Securum’s portfolio was limited 
to assets from Nordbanken. The portfolio consisted of mostly nonperforming loans with a 
minimum size of SEK 15 million, most of which were related to real estate (Securum AB 
1997). Securum was fully government-owned, but it had an independent board and a 
managing director; the board had a single representative from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
(Klingebiel 2000; Securum AB 1997). 
In addition to Nordbanken/Securum, another individual asset management company (AMC) 
was established to take over the bad assets from Gota Bank. The Gota Bank group consisted 
of three separate banks, and the holding company entered into bankruptcy in September 
1992. The Bank Support Authority acquired Gota Bank’s bad debts and sold them to Retriva, 
the aforementioned individual AMC. Retriva’s portfolio consisted of SEK 42 billion in loans—
an amount equal to nearly 50% of Gota Bank’s total lending—and SEK 3 billion in assets. 
Gota Bank had written down the assets prior to the transfers more aggressively than 
Securum, with SEK 26 billion in total asset write-downs. Retriva was financed using SEK 3.8 
billion in equity (compared to the SEK 24 billion for Securum) from the government and SEK 
3.5 billion in government-guaranteed loans (Securum AB 1997). 
Overall, SEK 112 billion in assets at face value were transferred to Securum/Retriva at a 
transfer price of SEK 66 billion. After further write-downs and devaluation, the assets had 
an estimated market value of SEK 53 billion (Securum AB 1997). 
Both Securum and Retriva followed similar operational approaches to managing and 
disposing of assets and loans. Initially, the focus was on preventing further price 
deterioration. Securum could restructure loans or companies, but its most frequent loan 
management solution was to pursue bankruptcy, foreclose on the loan, and take over the 
underlying collateral (Securum AB 1997). Most of the loan portfolio was related to real 
estate, and after taking over the property collateral for the majority of its loan portfolio, 
Securum owned between 1% and 2% of commercial property in Sweden (Cerruti and 
Neyens 2016). 
 
3 According to OFX, the yearly average exchange rate in 1993 was SEK 1 = USD 0.12858. 
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Securum established subsidiary companies to manage specific types of assets: there were 
four regional property companies, a tourism and hotel subsidiary, an industrial focused 
company, and a subsidiary in London to manage foreign assets. These companies managed 
properties and assets and were responsible for divestment of their asset portfolios (Securum 
AB 1997). 
Securum did not auction its portfolio of assets. Instead, it engaged in private negotiations 
with potential buyers and initiated individual or bulk sales of properties, some of which were 
organized as the sale of a property holding company. Securum also divested of property 
holding companies through initial public offerings (IPOs). Though IPOs accounted for less 
than 50% of total asset disposals, there were four cases of domestic IPOs and one IPO in 
London (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
In 1996, Securum acquired Retriva for SEK 3.8 billion, returning to the government its 
capital. Securum acquired the remaining assets in Retriva’s portfolio, which totaled SEK 11 
billion (Securum AB 1997). Prior to its acquisition, Retriva had followed a similar operational 
approach as Securum. 
Securum was initially expected to operate over a timeframe of 10 to 15 years (Securum AB 
1997). In 1995, Securum’s management proposed winding down the company by the end of 
1997, and Parliament formally dissolved Securum in June 1997. Securum’s disposal activities 
reflect the accelerated timeline: it divested 25% of its real estate portfolio in 1997 and 60% 
of the portfolio in 1997. Over the course of its lifetime, Securum disposed of 98% of its assets. 
The remaining assets, worth SEK 2 billion, were transferred to Vasakronan and Venantius, 
two state-owned holding companies (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Securum and Retriva had 
been capitalized with SEK 28 billion, but at the time of closure, Securum returned 
approximately SEK 14 billion to the state (Securum AB 1997). 
Summary Evaluation 
Securum is considered by many to be a successful example of an asset management 
company. It was able to dispose of 98% of its assets much more quickly than expected—
although the average recovery rate was just 27% based on the overall purchase price of SEK 
66 billion and a recovered value of SEK 18 billion4 (Securum AB 1997). However, its relative 
success may not be easily replicable (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Some of its success may be 
attributed to its design, but Securum’s management and other scholars have noted that 
Sweden’s economic recovery and general business climate contributed to Securum’s success 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Klingebiel 2000; Securum AB 1997). More broadly, the strong 
global economy in the 1990s led to a strong Swedish economy, making “it difficult to 
disentangle keen Swedish policy choices from macroeconomic ‘luck’” when considering the 
Swedish crisis response (Ergungor and Cherny 2009). 
Some scholars cite a number of factors beyond the broader macroeconomic conditions as 
contributing to Securum’s success at quickly restructuring and disposing of its bad assets 
 
4 Securum acquired Retriva for SEK 3.8 billion, returning the capital to the government. When Securum closed, 
it returned SEK 14 billion in capital to the government, bringing the total recovered value to SEK 18 billion. 
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(Ergungor 2007; Klingebiel 2000). Securum’s portfolio comprised primarily large 
commercial real estate assets; restructuring and managing these assets was less politically 
sensitive than doing so for other types of assets, and Securum may have had a comparative 
advantage in managing the larger, complex cases (Klingebiel 2000). Other factors attributed 
to Securum’s success include its professional management, political independence, skilled 
staff, sufficient funding, an adequate bankruptcy regime, IT management systems, and 
transparency (Ergungor 2007). 
Securum was politically insulated. It was owned by the government but managed by 
independent professionals (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Though there was political criticism 
of Securum’s bonus and remuneration policies, the “politicians safeguarded Securum’s 
independence and the company’s management was able to act independently on most 
issues” (Bergström, Englund, and Thorell 2003). Sweden also had an efficient and effective 
bankruptcy and foreclosure regime that enabled Securum to operate quickly. No special 
powers or extraordinary legal authority were deemed necessary, allowing Securum to begin 
operating immediately, as the agency did not have to wait on additional legislation or 
political processes to grant it special powers (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
Cerruti and Neyens (2016) also cite Securum’s status as an ordinary company as 
contributing to its success. It was not subject to the same regulations as a bank would have 
been, allowing it to operate in a profit-maximizing manner. Securum did not have a social 
mission, and its mandate was limited to recovering Nordbanken and Gota Bank assets. 
Despite being considered “highly successful” there was criticism that Securum was “trigger-
happy” in using bankruptcy and foreclosure as a resolution method (Cerruti and Neyens 
2016; Ergungor 2007). Though analysis points to the fact that a relatively high proportion of 
Securum’s debtors were declared bankrupt compared to other companies in a similar 
financial situation, Bergström, Englund, and Thorell (2003) note that Securum was 
consistent in its strategy of dealing with debtors: those with low profitability, unpaid 
interest, and other characteristics filed for bankruptcy. 
Englund (2015) and Ergungor (2007) have noted that perhaps Securum could have achieved 
higher total returns by operating over an additional two or three years. Though Securum’s 
management and other scholars seem to agree that its early wind-down was a success, 
Englund (2015) notes that Securum could have sold its portfolio at higher prices if it had 
waited an additional few years. Ergungor (2007) notes that the “main weakness of such 
criticism is that the market may never recover if a large inventory of assets is sitting on the 
sidelines, ready to be dumped onto buyers when prices go up,” while Englund (2015) 
acknowledges that “expecting such fine tuning of the process would be unrealistic.” 
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Securum and Retriva: Sweden Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$274.4 billion in 1991 
$284.3 billion in 1992 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$31,823 in 1991 
$32,801 in 1992 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 
No ratings data as of 1991 
and 1992 
Size of banking system 
 
$164.6 billion in 1991 
$162.3 billion in 1992 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
60% in 1991 
57.1% in 1992 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
Data not available in 1991 
and 1992 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
Data not available in 1991 
and 1992 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available in 1991 
and 1992 
Government ownership of banking system 23% in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance No 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Porta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes, and Shleifer 
2002; theglobaleconomy.com. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: In addition to Securum and Retriva, the Swedish government’s 
response to the banking crisis included a broad guarantee of bank liabilities, 
recapitalizations, and bank restructurings. 
In response to the financial difficulties facing two systemically important Swedish banks, the 
government initially adopted an ad hoc approach: a capital injection for Nordbanken and 
preferential lending with a guarantee for Första Sparbanken. The government, as 
Nordbanken’s majority shareholder, subscribed to SEK 4.2 billion of Nordbanken’s SEK 5.2 
billion new equity issue. Financial difficulties continued to surface in Swedish banks as Gota 
Bank would fail to meet its capital requirements. The government assumed the liabilities of 
Gota Bank, but the holding company was declared bankrupt. The government nationalized 
the bank and provided a loan guarantee of SEK 10 billion (Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995). 
In the fall of 1992, the Ministry of Finance outlined a plan to address the currency and 
banking crises (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). A key component of this was a blanket guarantee 
of bank deposits and liabilities. Through the blanket guarantee, the government committed 
to ensuring that the banks would be able to meet credit commitments in a timely manner 
(Jonung, Kiander, and Vartia 2009). The act also created the Bank Support Authority 
(Bankstödsnämnden), which could provide assistance to banks and financial institutions 
using four methods: 
(1) Issuing guarantees to cover future credit losses and lost returns on assets, 
(2) Granting loans or loan guarantees, 
(3) Providing guarantees on the issuance of new shares, and 
(4) Granting other types of capital contributions (Jonung, Kiander, and Vartia 2009; 
Securum AB 1997). 
In practice, the government’s crisis support varied across banks. Handelsbanken and SEB, 
the largest private commercial banks, were recapitalized by shareholders and established 
internal bad bank subsidiaries. Government support to these banks was limited to the 
benefit of the blanket guarantee. Similarly, Föreninsbanken, a cooperative bank, benefited 
only from the blanket guarantee. Första Sparbanken merged with 10 smaller banks to form 
the Savings Bank Sverige, which benefited from both the guarantee and interest rate 
subsidies from the government. For Gota Bank and Nordbanken, the government utilized 
multiple tools, including the transfer of bad assets to individual AMCs (Cerruti and Neyens 
2016). 
2. Legal Authority: Legal authority for bank restructuring, recapitalization, and 
assistance was granted by the Swedish Parliament and implemented by the Bank 
Supervisory Authority. Parliament approved the proposal for Nordbanken’s 
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restructuring and created the Bank Supervisory Authority to provide bank 
support. 
Nordbanken’s bad assets were separated from the good assets and placed in Securum, while 
the bad assets from Gota Bank were separated and placed into Retriva. Initially, Nordbanken 
established an internal “Intensive Care” unit—which later became Securum—without 
government support. However, in 1992, the government realized that Nordbanken would 
not be able to maintain an 8% CAR. It decided to recapitalize the bank and create a separate 
bad bank subsidiary owned by the government (Securum AB 1997). 
The Swedish Parliament approved the restructuring of Nordbanken. In March and April of 
1992, the government worked to draft and finalize a bill under which the government would 
purchase the remaining shares in Nordbanken. The plan also included a SEK 10 billion 
capital injection for Nordbanken and capital injections for Securum (Securum AB 1997). This 
plan was approved in June 1992 (Jonung, Kiander, and Vartia 2009). At the beginning of 
1993, Securum officially separated from Nordbanken to become a fully government-owned 
company (Securum AB 1997). 
As a part of the December 1992 parliamentary action, the government created the Bank 
Support Authority. The Bank Support Authority could provide support to banks through 
guarantees, share purchases, or other means, and the authority intervened in Gota Bank after 
the parent holding company filed for bankruptcy. Gota Bank’s bad assets were carved out 
and placed in an internal bad bank subsidiary, Gota Bank Special Commitments, which began 
operating in January 1993. The Bank Supervisory Authority then sold the problem loans to 
Retriva in December 1993 (Securum AB 1997). 
3. Special Powers: Securum and Retriva did not have any extraordinary powers or 
authority, but they were exempt from an existing regulation which required that 
assets be liquidated in three years. 
Securum and Retriva operated under the Companies Act and did not receive special legal 
authority. It appears that the Swedish government determined that special powers were 
“unnecessary given the existence of adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure legislation” 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
Even though it was deemed unnecessary to give Securum and Retriva extraordinary powers, 
they were exempted from the existing requirement that assets be liquidated in three years. 
Other Swedish banks during the crisis were also exempt from this collateral liquidation 
requirement, as policymakers were concerned about creating downward pressure on asset 
prices if banks and AMCs flooded the market with problem assets during a short timeframe 
(Ergungor 2007). 
Securum and Retriva were established as finance companies, meaning that they did not have 
bank charters, which was considered “too restrictive” for the agencies to fulfill their 
objectives and mandates (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
4. Mandate: Securum and Retriva were given the mandate to take over, manage, and 
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dispose of problem assets and loans from Nordbanken and Gota Bank while 
minimizing the total cost to the taxpayer. 
Securum and Retriva were established with the specific purposes of acquiring, managing, 
and disposing of bad loans and assets from Nordbanken and Gota Bank, respectively. These 
activities were intended to stabilize the financial and real estate markets and allow the good 
components of the banks to continue operations. Securum was also given an explicit mission 
to recover “as much as possible of the acquired commitments, in order to minimize the 
State’s and thereby also the taxpayers’ cost” (Securum AB 1997). 
5. Ownership Structure: Securum and Retriva were initially established as internal 
subsidiaries of their banks, and later became fully government-owned finance 
companies; Securum acquired Retriva in 1996. 
In 1990, Nordbanken created an internal bad bank subsidiary to allow the bank to focus on 
daily operating activities while the “Intensive Care” unit subsidiary could focus on credit 
management of poor quality loans. At the beginning of 1993, Securum was officially 
separated from Nordbanken and became a fully government-owned finance company 
(Securum AB 1997). 
Because Gota Bank’s ongoing financial troubles led the government to take over the bank, 
Gota Bank’s bad loans were moved to a bad bank subsidiary, which was acquired by Retriva. 
In 1996, Securum acquired Retriva, thus merging the operations and portfolios of the two 
AMCs (Securum AB 1997). 
6. Governance/Administration: Securum and Retriva had managing directors and 
boards, and both Securum and Retriva established a number of subsidiary 
companies to manage specific operations related to loan management, asset 
management, and disposal. 
Securum and Retriva were fully owned by the government, but “the state did not assume the 
role of an active owner,” which created a separation between the ownership and control of 
the AMCs (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Securum had a managing director and a board 
composed of primarily real estate professionals, though a single Ministry of Finance official 
was on the board (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Klingebiel 2000). The MoF appointed Securum’s 
board, and the board appointed the senior management (Klingebiel 2000). This 
organizational and management structure was designed to preclude politicians from placing 
political pressure on Securum’s operations (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
The Swedish Bank Support Authority monitored Securum and Retriva’s operations. Securum 
also had a Market Committee of representatives from different businesses that monitored 
the soundness of Securum’s restructuring and management plans. Furthermore, Securum’s 
board established an Irregularity Committee to examine cases of fraud (Klingebiel 2000). 
Securum established subsidiary companies and units to manage specific components of its 
operations. Securum Treasury was established to manage financial flows, loan procurement, 
and currency. Securum Finans was responsible for credit management and processing 
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problem loans. Each case was analyzed and prepared by a project team, reviewed by a 
regional team, and approved by the central credit committee, which included 
representatives from Securum’s board. After taking over a loan’s collateral, Securum 
transferred the asset from Securum Finans to a different subsidiary company for 
management and disposal; these subsidiary companies were intended to manage the assets 
and improve divestment opportunities (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum established four regional real estate management subsidiaries, a subsidiary to 
manage hotel and tourism-related assets, and a holding company for assets related to 
industry. Because some of Securum’s portfolio was located outside Sweden, it established 
offices in London to manage disposal of foreign assets. The subsidiary asset company board 
was required to approve asset acquisitions. For coordination of domestic real estate 
management and activities, Securum established a special real estate committee (Securum 
AB 1997). 
Similar to Securum, Retriva established subsidiary companies: a finance company to manage 
the loans upon the acquisition from Gota Bank, a real estate company to manage properties 
in Sweden, and an asset management company. Unlike Securum, foreign holdings did not 
constitute as significant a portion of Retriva’s portfolio, so it did not establish a separate 
subsidiary to manage foreign properties (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum’s management was appointed in the fall of 1992, and it began to work on staffing 
the organization for loan and asset management. Securum recruited employees from 
Nordbanken but worked to ensure that individuals would not be involved in the liquidation 
of loans that they were involved in originating (Securum AB 1997). 
7. Size: It does not appear that the government set a predefined size for 
Securum/Retriva. 
In creating the AMCs for Nordbanken and Gota Bank, it does not appear that the government 
established a size limit. When Securum was established, it took over problem loans and 
assets with a total face value of SEK 67 billion, and Retriva took over a total of SEK 42 billion 
at face value (Securum AB 1997). 
8. Funding Source: The Swedish government provided capital and guaranteed loans 
to Securum and Retriva; Nordbanken also provided financing to Securum. 
Securum purchased SEK 50 billion in assets from Nordbanken. The Swedish government 
provided SEK 24 billion, and Nordbanken provided SEK 27 billion to fund the AMC. Funding 
from the government was in the form of equity while Nordbanken lent “advantageous 
credits” to Securum. The government guaranteed SEK 10 billion of the loan from 
Nordbanken (Securum AB 1997). 
Gota Bank was taken over by the government and its bad loans were separated into an 
internal subsidiary. These loans were then purchased by Retriva, which was financed with 
SEK 3.8 billion in equity from the government and SEK 3.5 billion in government-guaranteed 
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loans (Securum AB 1997). It is not clear from Securum’s final report how the remaining SEK 
8.7 billion in Retriva’s portfolio was financed. 
Because additional write-downs were expected on Securum’s portfolio and because sales 
were not expected to begin for several months, the government capitalized Securum with 
SEK 24 billion in equity to cover the additional write-downs (Securum AB 1997). 
Furthermore, the substantial capital from the government was designed to prevent Securum 
from going back to the Swedish government to request additional funding, thus providing 
Securum with additional political insulation, especially in the scenario that it needed to 
operate over the long term (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
Unlike Nordbanken, Gota Bank had significantly written down the value of the loan portfolio 
prior to transfer to the AMC. Therefore, it was not expected that Retriva would have to record 
significant write-downs on the portfolio and its equity capital was smaller than that of 
Securum (Securum AB 1997). 
9. Eligible Institutions: Securum and Retriva were established specifically to manage 
the bad assets of individual financial institutions that the government had taken 
over: Securum for Nordbanken and Retriva for Gota Bank. 
Other Swedish banks and finance companies benefited from different types of governmental 
assistance, but Securum and Retriva were each established to acquire and manage problem 
loans from individual financial institutions (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Participation was 
mandatory as both banks were government-owned at the time of the asset transfers. 
Nordbanken first created an internal bad bank subsidiary. The government then acquired 
the bad bank as part of its restructuring and assistance to the bank. After Gota Bank’s parent 
company declared bankruptcy, the Swedish government took over the bank and moved 
problem assets into an internal subsidiary unit; these assets were then transferred to Retriva 
(Securum AB 1997). 
10. Eligible Assets: Securum acquired bad assets from Nordbanken with a minimum 
value of SEK 15 million, and in practice, most of the assets were nonperforming 
loans related to real estate; from Gota Bank, Retriva took problem loans with a 
minimum size of SEK 5 million. 
Securum’s asset transfer process was highly dependent on Nordbanken, as the bank was 
responsible for selecting the assets to be transferred. External consultants and an auditing 
firm assisted with the valuation of assets and collateral (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The 
minimum asset size eligible for transfer to Securum was SEK 15 million (Securum AB 1997). 
However, assets could be transferred even if they were below the size threshold as long as 
they were related to the main loan that was transferred to Securum; this was intended to 
facilitate asset management and disposal. Securum’s portfolio consisted primarily of loans, 
which accounted for more than 90% of the portfolio while shares and real estate comprised 
the remainder of its portfolio at the time of transfer (Securum AB 1997). Overall, Securum 
acquired more than 3,000 loans to 1,274 companies, and approximately 80% of its portfolio 
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was related to real estate (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Securum AB 1997). Approximately 10% 
of Securum’s portfolio was related to real estate assets abroad (Securum AB 1997). 
Retriva’s portfolio originated in Gota Bank, which transferred the assets to an internal bad 
bank subsidiary, Gota Bank Special Commitments, after Gota Bank’s holding company 
declared bankruptcy in 1992. The Bank Support Authority then acquired the portfolio and 
sold the assets to Retriva in 1993. The loan portfolio was limited to loans with a value of SEK 
5 million or more. At the time of transfer to Retriva, the 3,700 loans were grouped into 1,200 
commitments because of shared collateral or ownership. Retriva’s portfolio accounted for 
nearly half of Gota Bank’s total lending (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum and Retriva acquired a cumulative SEK 102 billion in loans at face value, SEK 
3 billion in properties, and SEK 7 billion in shares (most of which were in Nobel Industrier), 
for a total portfolio of assets of SEK 112 billion (Securum AB 1997). 
11. Acquisition – Mechanics: The transfers of assets from Nordbanken to Securum and 
from Gota Bank to Retriva were facilitated by the Swedish government. 
Securum and Retriva were components of the broader restructuring of the Swedish banking 
system. The government had fully taken over Nordbanken, then its loans and the associated 
reserves were transferred to the government. In September 1992, Gota Bank, which had 
become insolvent, was acquired by Nordbanken (Englund 2015). Because Securum and 
Retriva were part of the government’s restructuring of two government-owned banks, the 
actual mechanics of the transfer are not clear. Cerruti and Neyens (2016) do not consider 
Securum and Retriva to have purchased assets and note that it did not purchase assets in 
exchange for any consideration. 
12. Acquisition – Pricing: The purchase prices for the portfolios from Nordbanken and 
Gota Bank were based on their diminished book values after substantial write-
downs for expected loan losses. 
Securum’s portfolio, which had a face value of SEK 67 billion, was acquired for SEK 50 billion 
as Nordbanken wrote down SEK 17 billion on the portfolio prior to the transfer. According 
to Securum’s final report, it was expected that additional write-downs would be necessary, 
and these write-downs were to be covered by government’s SEK 24 billion capitalization of 
Securum (Securum AB 1997). 
Compared to the assets Nordbanken transferred to Securum, the assets transferred from 
Gota Bank to Retriva had already been more substantially written down by Gota Bank. The 
total portfolio of SEK 45 billion in initial book value had been written down to SEK 16 billion 
prior to transfer. The government did not expect that future write-downs would be required 
on the portfolio, leading it to capitalize Retriva with just SEK 3.8 billion (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum and Retriva’s combined portfolio at face value before write-downs totaled SEK 102 
billion in loans at face value, SEK 3 billion in properties, and SEK 7 billion in shares (Securum 
AB 1997). 
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13. Management and Disposal (1): In many cases, Securum managed its portfolio of 
assets by initiating bankruptcy, foreclosing on underlying collateral, and then 
transferring those assets to a specialized subsidiary AMC for disposal and 
management. 
Securum’s first priority during its first six months of operations was to determine if it should 
manage a loan as a credit commitment or if it should foreclose upon the underlying collateral. 
The decision to foreclose on property collateral also involved the debtors filing for 
bankruptcy. Securum prioritized this determination at the beginning of its operations to 
prevent further deterioration in its portfolio value. Beyond taking over the underlying 
collateral, Securum could implement a repayment plan for the borrower, sometimes with 
concessions, or determine a reconstruction plan for the borrower (Securum AB 1997). 
Bankruptcy was the solution for 70% of Securum’s clients, and Securum took over the 
collateral securities as this was often the only “economically viable option” (Englund 2015; 
Securum AB 1997). 
After converting loans into other types of assets, Securum transferred the assets from 
Securum Finans, the subsidiary unit responsible for credit management, to one of its 
subsidiary asset management companies. Internally, Securum recorded the transfer of assets 
at the estimated market value, and the difference between the loan value and the market 
value of the collateral was recorded as a loss under Securum Finans (Securum AB 1997). 
Securum held between 1% and 2% of the total commercial real estate in Sweden after 
liquidating most of its loan portfolio (Englund 2015). In order to manage its large real estate 
portfolio, Securum transferred domestic real estate assets to one of its four regional real 
estate companies. Other subsidiary asset management companies included a company for 
the hotel and tourism industry, a holding company for industrial companies, and a foreign 
branch in the UK and other countries to manage the foreign real estate holdings (Securum 
AB 1997). 
These asset management companies sought to restructure and improve divestment 
opportunities for the assets. Through “structural deals,” Securum worked to package the 
assets into companies that were “better, larger, and stronger” and sell shares in these 
companies. For example, one regional real estate company, which rented and managed its 
portfolio of real estate properties, was listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1994 
(Securum AB 1997). Overall, Securum used the method of selling whole property companies 
through IPOs in four transactions in Sweden and one transaction in London. This method 
was “attractive” as it avoided further negative pressure on prices and provided “substantial 
returns to Securum,” but it accounted for less than half of the assets disposed of by Securum 
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
Beyond IPOs of property holding companies, Securum sold individual properties and 
packages of properties (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Englund 2015). Securum did not sell 
properties by auctions, as its preferred method of sale involved direct negotiations with 
potential buyers (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
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Retriva was organized similarly to Securum prior to the merger, as it also had subsidiary 
companies for specific and disposal purposes. However, because it had a smaller portion of 
foreign assets, it did not establish a separate subsidiary to manage foreign loans (Securum 
AB 1997). 
14. Management and Disposal (2): To better align employee incentives with the goals 
of Securum—specifically, maximum recovery and expedited operations—the 
management implemented a bonus and severance pay incentive structure. 
From the onset, it appears that Securum’s management was concerned about the mismatch 
between employee incentives and organizational incentives related to disposal and recovery 
(Securum AB 1997). In general, an AMC’s goal to maximize loan recovery and wind down as 
quickly as possible does not align with an employee’s long-term career goals or concerns 
about permanent job stability. Because of this, Securum’s management introduced the idea 
of an incentive program where bonuses were related to performance (Englund 2015). 
In practice, the employee incentive scheme was controversial and politically charged 
(Englund 2015). Although Securum’s board first discussed an incentive program in 
November 1992, it did not commit to an incentive structure until the spring of 1994 
(Bergström, Englund, and Thorell 2003). The program was limited to Securum Finans, which 
had already liquidated a large portion of the loan portfolio (Bergström, Englund, and Thorell 
2003). Beyond a bonus structure, Securum also adopted “generous severance packages to 
attract high quality people” (Klingebiel 2000). 
15. Timeframe: Initially, Securum was expected to operate over a 10- to 15-year 
timeframe, but Securum was wound down after operating for five years. 
When Securum began operating as a separate government-owned AMC, it was expected to 
operate over the course of up to 15 years (Securum AB 1997). In 1995, Securum’s 
management proposed that the AMC be wound down by the middle of 1997, and Parliament 
formally dissolved Securum in June 1997 (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In Securum’s final 
report, its management attributed the “dramatic decrease in interest levels and a generally 
improved business climate in Sweden and abroad” as the primary reason for Securum’s 
earlier end date (Securum AB 1997). 
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